Philosophy
Staff
Duncan Pritchard
2000 Abstracts
- 'Closure and Context', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80.
ABSTRACT. Mark Heller has recently put forward a spirited defence of the 'relevant alternatives' theory of knowledge and its rejection of the 'Closure' principle for knowledge. In particular, Heller tries to defuse two common contextualist objections by modifying the relevant alternatives account along contextualist lines. Three criticisms are levelled at this modified view. First, that insofar as Heller's defence of non-Closure goes through, then he does not need to yield to the 'conversational' contextualist's critique. Second, that insofar as he does concede this much to the contextualist, then he jeopardises his original defence of the argument for non-Closure (and with it his version of the relevant alternatives account). And, third, that by endorsing a 'hybrid' account of knowledge which incorporates both a relevant alternatives approach and elements of contextualism, Heller is left with an epistemological theory which is even less attractive than either of these theories taken individually.
- 'Is "God Exists" a "Hinge" Proposition of Religious Belief?', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40.
ABSTRACT. There are parallels between certain responses to local epistemological scepticism about religious belief and an influential reply to radical epistemological scepticism. What ties both accounts together is that they utilise, either implicitly or explicitly, a "hinge" proposition thesis which maintains that the pivotal beliefs in question are immune to sceptical attack even though they lack sufficient epistemic grounds. It is argued that just as this strategy lacks any anti-sceptical efficacy in the context of the radical sceptical debate, so it offers no defence against a localised scepticism regarding religious belief either. What the defender of religious belief should do, it is claimed, is re-examine the manner in which a commitment to the doctrine of epistemological internalism underlies the sceptical attack.
- 'Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge', Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214.
ABSTRACT. It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certain contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.
- 'Understanding Scepticism', Sats—The Nordic Journal of Philosophy 1 (2000), 107-23.
ABSTRACT. It is my contention that a number of prominent commentators on the problem of radical epistemological scepticism labour under a certain erroneous conception of what this problem involves. In particular, I argue that they tend to both underestimate and overestimate the issue that faces them. On the one hand, they are confused as to what would constitute a satisfactory answer to the sceptic. On the other, they concede far too much to the sceptic by failing to recognise that there are a number of defensive moves available to them, especially insofar as they endorse a version of epistemological externalism. In order to illustrate these claims, I focus upon Edward Craig's analysis of knowledge that, by his own admission, is unable to satisfactorily answer the challenge of radical scepticism.