Philosophy
Staff
Duncan Pritchard
2005 Abstracts
- 'Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206.
ABSTRACT. A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as a quandary directed at our possession of knowledge simpliciter, but rather as concerned with a specific kind of knowledge that is epistemically desirable. On this view, the source of scepticism lies in a peculiarly epistemic form of angst.
- 'The Structure of Skeptical Arguments', The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52.
ABSTRACT. The claim that the core radical skeptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is 'closed' under known entailments (the 'closure' principle) has become part of the conventional wisdom in recent years. Accordingly, the standard anti-skeptical project in the contemporary literature has involved either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the skeptical argument. There has, however, been one prominent strand of dissent to this received conception of the skeptical debate, which is Anthony Brueckner's contention that radical skeptical arguments in fact ultimately rest upon a different epistemic principle, what he refers to as an 'underdetermination' principle. It is argued here that, contra Stewart Cohen's influential critique of Brueckner in this respect, Brueckner's core thesis - that one can run a skeptical argument with the underdetermination principle alone - is essentially correct, though not in the fashion that he envisages. Indeed, it is claimed that Brueckner's argument, suitably understood, in fact highlights how the challenge posed by skepticism is both different, and far more intractable, than many have hitherto supposed.
- 'Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres', Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, (MIT Press, 2005).
ABSTRACT. Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposing constraints on what he calls "warranted assertibility manoeuvres" of this sort. This paper argues that, contra DeRose, the warranted assertibility manoeuvre directed at attributer contextualism is able to meet the constraints that DeRose lays down.
- 'Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge', Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43.
ABSTRACT. The recent literature on the theory of knowledge has taken a distinctive turn by focussing on the role of the cognitive and intellectual virtues in the acquisition of knowledge. The main contours and motivations for such virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge are here sketched in contrast to more traditional epistemological theories. It is argued that virtue epistemology in its most plausible form can be regarded as a refined form of reliabilism and epistemic externalism. Moreover, it is claimed that there is strong empirical support in favour of the virtue epistemic position so understood, and an empirical study regarding the cognitive processes employed by medical experts in their diagnosis and treatment of epilepsy is cited in this regard. In general, it is argued that one can best account for 'expert' knowledge in terms of a virtue-theoretic epistemology that retains key reliabilist and externalist features. It is thus shown that understanding knowledge along virtue-theoretic lines has important implications for our understanding of how knowledge is acquired, and thus for the philosophy of education.
- 'Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism', Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein's On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on "hinge propositions" in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis - viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the 'unearned warrant' thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. Indeed, it is argued that on a reading of On Certainty which has Wittgenstein advancing a primarily epistemological thesis, there is in fact strong evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein thought that no epistemic response to the sceptic was available - at best, it seems, only a pragmatic anti-sceptical thesis is on offer. Such a conclusion is not without import to the present debate regarding radical scepticism, however, since it poses a general challenge to how the sceptical argument is conceived in the contemporary literature.
- 'Testimony', The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, (Hart Publishing, 2005).
ABSTRACT. This paper offers an overview of the debate between proponents of the opposing inferentialist and default accounts of the epistemology of testimony, and considers the application of these accounts to the specific case of legal testimony. Some of the implications raised by the pragmatics of assertion are discussed in this regard along with, to a lesser extent, the problem posed by unconscious prejudice. It is concluded that, whatever the merits of inferentialism as an account of the epistemology of testimony in general, there are good grounds available for thinking that it is the correct account of the epistemology of legal testimony.
- 'Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism', Grazer Philosophische Studien (special issue on Contextualism), 67 (2005), 20-43.
ABSTRACT. Attributer contextualism has undoubtedly been the dominant anti-sceptical theory in the recent literature. Nevertheless, this view does face some fairly serious problems, and it is argued that when the contextualist position is compared to a refined version of the much derided 'Moorean' response to scepticism, then it becomes clear that there are distinct advantages to being a neo-Moorean rather than a contextualist.
- 'Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects' (with M. S. Brady), The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 161-71.
ABSTRACT. This is the introduction to the special double-issue on Epistemological Contextualism that Michael Brady and I edited which consists of papers from speakers at the conference on this topic at the University of Stirling in March 2004. Contributors to this volume include: Jessica Brown; Tony Brueckner; Stewart Cohen; Keith DeRose; Alan Millar; Charles Travis; Tim Williamson; and Crispin Wright.
- 'Greco on Scepticism' (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84.
ABSTRACT. This is a critical review of John Greco's excellent book, Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge UP, 2000).