Philosophy
Staff
Duncan Pritchard
2001 Abstracts
- 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent', Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49.
ABSTRACT. Perhaps the most dominant anti-sceptical proposal in the recent literature - advanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis - is the contextualist response to radical scepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other non-contextualist anti-sceptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the sceptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions. Taking DeRose's view as representative of the contextualist position, it is argued that instead of offering us an intuitive response to scepticism, contextualism is actually committed to a revisionist stance as regards our everyday usage of epistemic terms. In particular, it is argued that the thesis fails to present a satisfactory explication of a notion - that of 'epistemic descent' - that is pivotal to the anti-sceptical import of the account. On the positive side, however, it is claimed that although the contextualist response to scepticism is ultimately unsatisfying, DeRose's theory does contain within it the framework for a completely different - and far more persuasive - account of the 'phenomenology' of scepticism which runs along non-contextualist lines.
- 'Scepticism and Dreaming', Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90.
ABSTRACT. In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticism - which finds its core expression in Descartes' dreaming argument - can be defused by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright's 'implosion' of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright's own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I claim that even on the supposition that Wright has indeed succeeded in setting-up such an argument, he nevertheless fails to follow-through with an adequate response. A diagnosis of the failure of Wright's approach is then given in the context of the wider sceptical debate
- 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and "Hinge" Propositions', Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, 97-122, (Peter Lang, 2001).
ABSTRACT. A certain interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty - advanced by such figures as Hilary Putnam, Peter Strawson, Avrum Stroll and Crispin Wright - has become common currency in the recent literature. In particular, this reading focuses upon the supposed anti-sceptical import of the Wittgensteinian notion of a “hinge” proposition. In this paper it is argued that this interpretation is flawed both on the grounds that there is insufficient textual support for this reading and that, in any case, it leads to unpalatable philosophical problems. Moreover, it is claimed that the popularity of this construal of On Certainty in the contemporary debate reflects an implicit commitment to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism. Nevertheless, it is argued that, suitably modified along the epistemologically externalist lines suggested by Michael Williams, one might be able to resurrect a viable anti-sceptical hinge proposition thesis. Furthermore, it is claimed that such a conception of the notion also receives some, albeit inconclusive, textual support from On Certainty.
- 'A Puzzle about Warrant', Philosophical Inquiry 23 (2001), 59-72.
ABSTRACT. A puzzle about warranted belief, often attributed to Saul Kripke, has recently come to prominence. This puzzle claims to show that it follows from the possession of a warrant for one’s belief in an empirical proposition that one is entitled to dismiss all subsequent evidence against that proposition as misleading. The two main solutions that have been offered to this puzzle in the recent literature - by James Cargile and David Lewis - argue for a revisionist epistemology which, respectively, either denies the so-called 'Closure' principle that warrants transmit across known entailments, or 'contextualizes' the epistemic operator in question. In contrast, it is argued here that such revisionism is unnecessary because the puzzle in fact depends upon an ambiguity in the notion of warrant. It is claimed that once this ambiguity is made explicit then the puzzle dissipates.
- 'Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical Theories', Facta Philosophica 3 (2001), 101-26.
ABSTRACT. The epistemological problem of radical scepticism has provoked a good deal of discussion in the recent literature. It is my contention here, however, that before one can adequately engage in this debate one must first set a number of constraints on what would constitute an intellectually satisfactory answer to this problem. I motivate four such constraints, and highlight how they impact both on the "common-sense" response to the sceptic offered by G. E. Moore, and the more contemporary anti-sceptical argument which rests upon the denial of the Closure principle for knowledge.
- 'The Opacity of Knowledge', Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 2: The Internalism/Externalism Debate in Epistemology, (ed.) H. B. Shaeffer, 1-10, (Humboldt UP, 2001).
ABSTRACT. Here is a common 'intuition' that you’ll often find expressed regarding the epistemological externalism/internalism distinction. It is the thought that epistemological internalism, whatever its other faults, at least leaves the possession of knowledge a transparent matter; whereas epistemological externalism, whatever its other merits, at least makes the possession of knowledge opaque. It is the status of this view of the externalism/internalism contrast that I wish to evaluate in this paper. In particular, I argue that on the most credible interpretation of this 'transparency' thesis it is in fact inconsistent with even a minimal version of epistemological internalism. I conclude that knowledge is opaque on any plausible construal of knowledge, and consider some implications that this result has for the contemporary epistemological debate.