It is easy to deceive others but how can we deceive ourselves when we are both the deceiver and the deceived? If self-deception, is conceived on the model of intentionally deceiving another, how is such deception possible? If it is not then what are we to make of the phenomenon that is, perhaps misleadingly, called self-deception. These and other questions lead on to wider considerations concerning rationality, belief, and self-knowledge.
Room A69, Phone: x7966,
There will be five two-hour meetings (roughly fortnightly). Classes take the form of interactive group tutorials, rather than the usual diet of lectures and seminars.
A good starting point is the Alfred E. Mele’s entry ‘Self-deception’ in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Available on-line.)
This has a bibliography of key works.
Two useful collections of articles are:
Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1988).
Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. (Stanford, CA.: CSLI Publications, 1998).
For a defence of the possibility of intentional self-deception see:
Sebastian Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Coursework only - 2 assignments. Titles and submission dates to be discussed with, and approved by, the module coordinator.
For further information about this module please contact Alan Millar