Value Theory And Epistemology Workshop

ABSTRACT. Many deny that having an attitude can itself give us reasons. At most, having an attitude makes it irrational, or internally incoherent, of us to fail to have some other attitude. While I find this "nonpsychologism" attractive, it strains against familiar phenomena. In particular, it strains against the fact that intending an end often does change our reasons. I try to account for this in a way that is broadly compatible with nonpsychologism.

Chair: Duncan Pritchard (Stirling)

Respondent: Kent Hurtig (Stirling)

After the pre-workshop talk, there will be a dinner at La Bologna restaurant in Bridge of Allan (we're booked for 7.30pm). (Note change of venue to that previously advertised).

Saturday November 18th

Workshop

The Court Room

10.00-11.30am

Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund)

'Some Thoughts on the Analysis and Taxonomy of Value' (pdf)

ABSTRACT. In my talk I will focus on virtues and vices of the so-called buck-passing account of value. As for the vices, a couple of serious circularity problems will loom large: in particular, Ross's circularity objection and the so-called 'Wrong Kind of Reasons' Problem. As for the virtues I will especially consider one that relates to some issues in formal axiology: An implication of this format of analysis is that the logical space for possible value relations becomes radically enriched.

Chair: Rowan Cruft (Stirling)

Respondent: Alan Millar (Stirling)

11.30-12.00pm

Tea/Coffee

12.00-1.30pm

Michael Brady (Glasgow)

'Curiosity, Interest, and the Final Value of True Belief' (pdf)

ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on recent attempts to explain the final value of true belief by appeal to our natural curiosity. On this view, we can explain the value of true belief in light of the (alleged) fact that we are naturally curious about (some class of) truths. In the first section of my paper I consider how this explanation is supposed to work, and develop an account which can answer initial objections. I then raise a serious problem for this account, and consider the implications for explanations of the value of knowledge.

Chair: Alan Millar (Stirling)

Respondent: Peter Baumann (Aberdeen)

1.30-2.30pm

Lunch

2.30-4.00pm

Tim Chappell (Open University)

'Emotions As Perceptions of Value' (pdf)

ABSTRACT. My aim in this paper is to convince the reader that it is fruitful, and (who knows?) maybe even correct, to see emotions as perceptions of value. I shall argue that we can perceive (instances of) moral properties, and that the way that this perception happens is through our emotions. A central idea will be that realist moral cognitivism and a (cautious) cognitivism about the emotions are mutually supporting positions, and that the moral cognitivist can use cognitivism about the emotions to turn expressivism and sentimentalism on their heads. I shall agree with the sentimentalist that human affective response is deeply linked to value, but will see value as determinative of human affective response, not vice versa.

Chair: Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh)

Respondent: Jason Kawall (Colgate/St. Andrews)

4.00-4.30pm

Tea/Coffee

4.30-6.00pm

Niko Kolodny (Berkeley)

'Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?' (pdf)

ABSTRACT. Many believe that there are rational requirements to have attitudes whose contents are formally coherent as such: for example, the putative rational requirement either not to believe that p, or not to believe that not p. I doubt that there are any "as-such" requirements of this kind. In this talk, I discuss one reason for doubt. If there are as-such requirements, why should we conform to them? A common answer is that a disposition to conform to as-such requirements is worth having. I try to argue that this is not true.

Chair: Adrian Haddock (Stirling)

Respondent: Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford)

6.30pm

Workshop dinner, the Court Room

Getting Here

You can find lots of useful information to help you get to the University of Stirling, and find your way around once you're here, here.

Workshop Overview

This workshop is part of the Knowledge, Mind and Value project on The Value of Knowledge that is based in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling, and which is run by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. Further research events on this general theme have already been hosted, including the following:

A workshop on Epistemic Value
A conference on Epistemic Value

In addition, there is a forthcoming conference on Social Epistemology. The specific aim of this workshop is to bring together value theorists and epistemologists.

Watch out for details of further events. See also the project weblog, Epistemic Value, and the project Research Resources webpage.

This event is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

Registration

Registration for this workshop, including the pre-workshop talk, is free. If you have any inquiries about registration, then please direct them to Alison Scott. Aside from e-mail, she can also be reached by phone on (+44) (0) (1786) 467555. For all other inquiries, please contact Duncan Pritchard.

Philosophy

Workshops

Value Theory and Epistemology