

# ***Knowledge and Action***

The Court Room  
The University of Stirling  
May 25<sup>th</sup> and May 26<sup>th</sup> 2007

## ***Friday 25<sup>th</sup> May***

3.30 – 4.15                      Welcome reception

4.15 – 6.15

### **Christopher Peacocke (Columbia)**

*Knowledge of Action: Its Nature and Significance*

ABSTRACT. How do you know that you are performing an action, be it a bodily action or a mental action? I argue that you know this by taking an apparent action-awareness at face value. Action-awareness is a conscious state that represents it as being the case that you are performing some particular kind of action. This account is not open to the objections raised by Shoemaker, for instance, to perceptual models of introspection. Those objections are based on the mistaken principle that the independence of what is perceived, or indeed known by action-awareness, implies the possibility of what Shoemaker calls ‘self-blindness’ for the subject-matter in question. I argue that there is no such implication, and that the data Shoemaker cites can be explained in a different way. The model of action-awareness also explains how thinkers can know the intentional contents of their judgements, decisions and other mental actions, when taken in combination with a good theory of concepts of the contents of our intentional states. Knowing, on the basis of action-awareness, that your judgement is about water is not at all like making an inference from the redness of your arm to the conclusion that it is sunburned.

Commentator: Fabian Dorsch (Fribourg)

Chair: Adrian Haddock

7.30 – late

Dinner, at Campbells@Chambo, Bridge of Allan

## *Saturday 26<sup>th</sup> May*

10.00 – 11.30

### **John Gibbons (Nebraska)**

*Seeing What You're Doing*

ABSTRACT. We have some kind of privileged access to our own intentional actions. At least typically, if we're doing it on purpose, we know what we're doing. This privilege consists in the fact that the facts in virtue of which you're intentionally acting are not independent of the facts in virtue of which you're in a position to know what you're doing. An explanation of this privilege is an explanation of the relevant sort of non-independence. In this paper, I try to explain privileged access to action on the basis of the following idea. Ordinary intentional action requires a great deal of ordinary empirical knowledge, and this knowledge is usually sufficient to let you know what you're doing. Since both action and knowledge of action depend on the same empirical knowledge, we have the kind of non-independence that explains privilege.

Commentator: Matthew Manning (Birkbeck)

Chair: Alan Millar

11.30 – 12.00

Break

12.00 – 1.30

### **Matthew Soteriou (Warwick)**

*Intention, Self-Governance, and Self-Knowledge*

ABSTRACT: I compare and contrast Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention with David Velleman's epistemic account of intention, and argue that the right account of intention will need to appeal to aspects of both approaches. In the paper I suggest that some of the apparent tensions between these approaches can be reconciled by a notion that connects them – a notion of self-governance – and that this notion of self-governance provides a crucial connection between the mental actions of practical deliberation and planning, and the kind of practical self-knowledge that intention can embody and that one's actions can realise.

Commentator: Matthew Nudds (London)

Chair: TBA

1.30 – 2.30

Lunch

2.30 – 4.00

**Maria Alvarez (Southampton)**

*Anscombe on Practical Knowledge*

ABSTRACT: TBA

Commentator: TBA

Chair: TBA

4.00 – 4.30

Break

4.30 – 6.00

**Johannes Roessler (Warwick)**

*Transparency and Practical Knowledge*

ABSTRACT:

Commentator: TBA

Chair: TBA

6.00 – 7.00

Wine reception

7.00

Workshop Dinner, The Court Room