

Testimony and the Value of Knowledge

(First draft)

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“Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

“At a certain point philosophy needs to make way to history, or, as I prefer to say, to involve itself in it.” (Bernard Williams)

1. Introduction

In this paper I seek to defend a *communitarian* form of *value-driven* epistemology. “Value-driven epistemology” studies the epistemic value of various cognitive achievements, such as knowledge, understanding, or wisdom.¹ The favourite question of value-driven epistemologists is whether knowledge is epistemically more valuable than other cognitive states; for instance, whether knowledge is epistemically more valuable than true belief (*simpliciter*), reliably-produced true belief, or justified true belief. A form of epistemology qualifies as “communitarian” if its investigations are guided by the assumption that human cognizers are “highly gregarious and deeply interdependent” creatures.² Putting the two elements together, a communitarian form of value-driven epistemology seeks to understand the values of various cognitive states in relation to the needs and actions of human beings in social interaction with one another.

In the present context I shall not try to offer anything like a “comprehensive” communitarian value-driven epistemology. My main focus will be on the idea that knowledge is valuable as a collective good. In giving content to this idea I shall draw on two traditions that to date have played little or no role in value-driven epistemology: the “genealogy” of epistemological concepts and virtues (Craig 1990, Williams 2002), and the “sociology of scientific knowledge” (especially Barnes 1995, 2000 and Shapin 1994). I shall use these traditions in order to construct an alternative to Jonathan Kvanvig’s highly – and deservedly – influential version of value-driven epistemology (Kvanvig 2003). In my view, Kvanvig’s work on the value of knowledge is too static, too abstract, not sufficiently historical, and not suitably attentive to the social nature of knowledge. Put differently, in his recent work on the value of knowledge, Kvanvig

seems to have forgotten the most important insight of his earlier study of intellectual virtue (Kvanvig 1992). In 1992 Kvanvig wrote that “divorcing epistemological concerns from the realities of social interaction generates an epistemology built on answers to questions as relevant to the life of the mind as ‘desert island’ cases are in ethics” (1992: 178). And he insisted that epistemologists should focus on “bunches of people rather than isolated individuals, bodies of knowledge rather than individuated propositions, and experienced, processual chunks of time rather than abstracted, individual time-slices” (1992: 186). I wholeheartedly applaud these views. And I am ready to defend them even against (the more recent) Kvanvig himself.

Lest some readers will be disappointed by the sketchy nature of what follows, let me conclude my introductory comments with a warning. This study is more about hammering out a rough position than about fine conceptual distinctions or detailed defences against all conceivable objections. As Kant once inimitably put it in defence of the intricacy and complexity of his epistemological writings: “Hammer and chisel are perfectly fine for working raw lumber, but for copperplate one must use an etching needle” (Kant 2004: 9). As far as communitarian value-driven epistemology is concerned, we are still in the era of raw lumber; the time of copperplate and needlework is still to come. For the moment, at least in this area, we have to learn “how to philosophise with the hammer” (Nietzsche 1990).

2. Kvanvig’s Value-Driven Epistemology

Kvanvig’s recent book *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding* (2003) has put the issue of epistemic value on a new and high level of content and clarity. Kvanvig’s starting point is the insistence that a satisfactory account of knowledge must explain both its *nature* and its *value* (2003: x). We have captured the *nature* of knowledge if, and only if, with respect to the *concept* of knowledge we have succeeded in constructing an explicit and correct *intension* for our intuitive *extension*.³ We have identified the *value* of knowledge if, and only if, the reconstructed intension can explain why we are prone to think that knowledge itself – or some of its components, or some concepts in the vicinity of knowledge – are epistemically valuable.

Kvanvig defends a form of *value-scepticism* about knowledge; he maintains that there is no *knowledge-specific* epistemic value. There is no distinctive epistemic value that all and only the elements of the extension of *knowledge* share. (From here on, I shall write *concepts* in italics, “words” in inverted commas, and leave elements of the extension unmarked.) Kvanvig argues by elimination: he shows that no existing account of the intension of *knowledge* can explain why we find all and only elements of the

intuitive extension of *knowledge* epistemically valuable in a distinctive and unique way. Here I shall briefly mention just four proposals and why they fail; my aim is to give (the novice to value-driven epistemology) a flavour, rather than a detailed summary, of Kvanvig's reasoning.

(a) *Knowledge is true belief*. One possible defence of this thesis is to say that justification is not a *constituent* of knowledge, but merely an external *instrument for reaching* it. Kvanvig rejects this view on the grounds that it seems more in line with linguistic usage to say that justification is an instrument for *reaching the truth* than to claim that justification is an instrument for *reaching knowledge* (2003: 9). Although Kvanvig thus opposes the notion that knowledge is true belief, he nevertheless defends the epistemic value of both belief and truth. Beliefs are valuable as guides to action, and truth is of general interest to us (2003: 38-41).

(b) *Knowledge is true belief plus a property that renders the truth of the belief objectively likely*. This formula captures a number of positions, amongst them reliabilism. The reliabilist thinks that knowledge is more valuable than true belief since a true belief produced by a reliable truth-tracking method is epistemically better than a true belief produced in some other, arbitrary, way. After all, a reliable truth-tracking method makes it objectively highly likely that its products will be true. Kvanvig throws out this thought on the basis of the "swamping argument". The epistemic value of a *true belief that is objectively likely to be true* can never be greater than the epistemic value of a *true belief simpliciter*. The epistemic value of a true belief "swamps" the value of using a method that makes the belief likely to be true (Kvanvig 2003: 47-9). The case is analogous to the following. Assume that the taste of the cup of green tea I am currently drinking is perfect; in no possible world does it taste any better than it tastes here. As it happens, this cup was prepared by a total novice in tea-making (i.e. me) who achieved the perfect taste largely by accident. However, that this perfect taste was produced by accident does not diminish it. Perfect taste is perfect taste, whatever its causes. Even if, counterfactually, this perfectly-tasting cup of tea had been brewed by a Japanese "Grand Tea Master", the pleasure of the taste would not be greater. The fact that the Grand Tea Master is objectively more likely (than me) to bring about the perfect taste has no bearing on the taste of this very cup. The perfect taste of this cup swamps whatever value there might be in having one's tea prepared by a Grand Tea Master. – The swamping argument works not only against reliabilism but also against any other third condition that is meant to be *instrumental* in getting us to the truth.

(c) *Knowledge is subjectively justified true belief*. Kvanvig accepts that – at least under a certain reading of "subjective justification" – subjectively justified true beliefs are epistemically valuable. On the "certain reading" in question, subjective justification

is not merely of *instrumental* value for reaching the truth. To be instrumentally valuable is *just one way* of being *extrinsically* valuable; where *A* is extrinsically valuable with respect to *B* if, and only if, the value of *A* is explicable in terms of the value of *B*. In the present case, the extrinsic but non-instrumental value of subjective justification has to do with the fact that, as mental states, subjective justifications are *reflectively accessible*: we usually can tell by means of reflection alone whether we have a justification or not. In this respect justification differs from truth. Merely reflecting on a belief does not (usually) help one decide whether or not the belief is true (2003: 66). It is reflective accessibility that gives subjective justifications an extrinsic but non-instrumental value. The epistemic value of reflectively accessible subjective justifications must be explicated in terms of the value of truth – after all, justifications are supposed to help with reaching the truth. But subjective justifications bear a feature that truth lacks: reflective accessibility. And hence the epistemic value of subjective justification is not swamped by the epistemic value of truth. Unfortunately, all this does not mean that we have found a distinctive epistemic value for knowledge. The two concepts *subjectively justified true belief* and *knowledge* are not co-extensive. It seems that to get from subjectively justified true belief to knowledge we need to add a fourth, Gettier-case-blocking, component.

(d) *Knowledge is subjectively justified true belief plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier cases.* This suggestion picks up where the previous left off. Kvanvig now argues that no fourth condition is able to close the gap between knowledge and justified true belief. The key difficulty is that all existing offers for a fourth condition fail the value-test: none of them excludes a form of accidentality that we find “intuitively disvaluable”. The point can also be put in terms of a dilemma: trying to solve the problem of the nature of knowledge, we are led, as far as the fourth condition is concerned, to ever more “complex, ad hoc and gerrymandered proposals”. And yet, attempting to make progress with the value of knowledge, we are forced to look towards “simpler proposals in which the value of the condition is intuitively obvious”. Kvanvig’s conclusion: “The Gettier problem shows that no component-based account of the value of knowledge will be successful” (2003: 117).

Having established his value-scepticism regarding knowledge, Kvanvig offers a more upbeat assessment concerning the distinctive epistemic value of “factive understanding”. We take understanding factively when we accept that to understand that *p* implies *p*. (E.g. “John understands that he is still a child” implies “It is a fact that John is still a child.”) On Kvanvig’s analysis, factive understanding is similar to knowledge in one respect, but radically different from knowledge in another respect. Factive understanding is similar to knowledge if knowledge is rendered according to internalist

coherence theories of justification. In other words, understanding “requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large and comprehensive body of information” (2003: 192). The radical dissimilarity is that, other than knowledge, understanding does not require a condition that excludes epistemic luck. Understanding is distinctly epistemically valuable because: first, true beliefs are valuable; second, grasped coherence relations are relations of subjective justification, and, as such, reflectively accessible; third, grasped coherence relations enable both the finding and organising of new truths and the development of our thinking about a given subject matter; fourth, having an organised system of beliefs is pragmatically useful for action; and fifth, elements of thought that are organised in this way allow for the “intrinsically satisfying closure of the process of inquiry” (2003: 202).

3. *Craig’s Genealogy of Knowledge and Epistemic Value*

It is striking and surprising to note that among the proposals considered by Kvanvig only one is part of the recent “social turn” in epistemology.⁴ The sole representative of this turn is a social-pragmatic version of the theory of epistemic virtue. Kvanvig ascribes this view to an unpublished paper by a past self of John Greco (Kvanvig 2003: 83). According to the young Greco, we value epistemically virtuous believers on the prudential grounds that they make for good informants. Kvanvig repudiates this approach on several grounds. His most important point is that true believers are better informants than intellectually virtuous believers. Given the brevity of Kvanvig’s discussion, it is impossible to make out what considerations led Greco to his conception, or whether Kvanvig’s criticism of Greco is fair. Fortunately, in two short footnotes Kvanvig registers his impression that Greco’s stance is a “close cousin” of the theory advanced in Edward Craig’s book *Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis* (1990) (Kvanvig 2003: 83). I therefore turn to a brief reconstruction of Craig’s main line of thought before returning to Kvanvig’s critical assessment.⁵

Craig’s book introduces a new method for understanding key concepts in epistemology. I shall follow Bernard Williams – about whom more below – and call this method “genealogy” (2002: 32). Craig himself speaks of “conceptual synthesis” in the title of his book. Craig’s synthesis contrasts with traditional philosophical analysis. Take the concept *knowledge* (and its cognates). By an “analysis” of *knowledge* Craig means the enterprise of trying to find components of the concept that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. Work of conceptual analysis proceeds by trying to provide an explicit or fully articulated intension for an intuitive extension. It is not part of

conceptual analysis to ask why delimiting *this* rather than some other extension is of value to the concept-users. Conceptual synthesis inverts the route taken by analysis: it seeks to illuminate *knowledge* by providing a hypothetical historical narrative of the process in which this concept was put together. This narrative is constrained by two ideas. The first idea is that of an epistemic “state of nature”, that is, of an imaginary, early, social community composed of language-using human beings who are cooperative though not kin, and whose conceptual and reflective powers are somewhat weaker than our own. The genealogical narrative must make intelligible why these creatures found it useful or valuable to introduce an ancestor of our concept of *knowledge*. This aspect of genealogy situates it in the proximity of value-driven epistemology. Craig himself writes that he is “asking after the roots of the value of knowledge” (1990: 7). The second constraint is social-developmental: the genealogical narrative must explain – invoking social change as the central cause – why the ancestor concept was eventually replaced by our concept. For ease of reference, I shall refer to the ancestor concept and word (and their cognates) as *protoknowledge*, “protoknowledge”, *protoknower*, etc.

The first part of Craig’s genealogical story – why is *protoknowledge* found useful in the state of nature – goes as follows. In the state of nature, individuals depend upon one another for information. Distinguish between the roles of “inquirer” and “informant”. The inquirer needs information that she is currently unable to directly obtain herself; the informant offers such information. Inquirers must be able to separate good from bad informants. And it is natural to assume that meeting this need will involve concepts. Assume that *protoknower* is the central conceptual tool for dealing with this problem. Which conceptual components should *protoknower* contain? What should we hypothesise our imaginary ancestors to want this concept for? Craig’s answers are that our ancestors want this concept as a tag for good informants and that the concept *protoknower* (*whether p*) comprises the following elements: (i) being as likely to be right about *p* as the inquirer’s current needs require; (ii) being honest; (iii) being able to make the inquirer believe that *p*⁶; (iv) being accessible to the informant here and now; (v) being understandable to the inquirer; and (vi) being detectable as a good informant concerning *p* by the inquirer. To elaborate briefly only on the last point, the inquirer needs to find properties (=X), “indicator-properties”, that she is able to detect and that correlate closely and in a lawlike fashion with holding a true belief, or telling the truth, as to whether *p* (1990: 25, 135). “Being on top of a tree” might be such a property *X* for some inquirers in the state of nature when *p* is the proposition that a tiger is approaching the village. Usually more than one *X* will be involved. The properties that make Fred a medical protoknower are not one but many. Craig is adamant that (i) to (vi) are not

necessary and sufficient conditions. While all of these elements are present in “prototypical” situations, the concept has a use even when some of the elements are missing. Finally, *protoknowledge* differs from *knowledge* in that: (a) only the former is closely tied to testimony; (b) *protoknowledge* is not a fully public concept insofar as it is indexed to the capacities and needs of specific inquirers (1990: 90); (c) *protoknowledge* can be ascribed only to others but not to oneself; and (d) *protoknowledge* is not undermined by accident or luck: users of *protoknowledge* lack the intellectual sophistication to distinguish between accidental and non-accidental fulfilment of the conditions of *protoknowledge*.

This brings us to the second half of the genealogical just-so story: the hypothetical social-historical narrative that takes us from *protoknowledge* to *knowledge*. Craig speaks of this development as a process of “objectivisation” of *protoknowledge*. Key steps in this objectivisation are the following. First, *protoknowledge* comes to be used in self-ascription. In response to the question “who knows whether *p*?” group members start to investigate their own indicator-properties. Second, inquirers begin to recommend informants to others. This can be done in a helpful manner only if the perspectival or indexical character of *protoknowledge* is weakened. The recommended informant must be good in the eyes of both the recommender and the recipient of the recommendation. Further movement in this dimension – recommending an informant to ever more inquirers – makes *protoknowledge* increasingly harder to get. The endpoint is the idea of “someone who is a good informant as to whether *p* whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer ... That means someone with a very high degree of reliability, someone who is very likely to be right – for he must be acceptable even to a very demanding inquirer” (1990: 91). And a very demanding inquirer will not accept epistemic luck or accident. Third, inquirers begin to use “being recommended” as an indicator property. This move dilutes the original detectability requirement. Inquirers begin calling someone a “protoknower” even when none of the original “natural” indicator-properties is in sight. Fourth, in the context of group action inquirers cease to care whether the needed information is accessible to them as individuals; they are satisfied if it is accessible to someone in the group. As a result they will speak of *protoknowledge* even outside the context of testimony. The process of objectivisation ends up with our concept of *knowledge*: “The concept of knowing ... lies at the objectivised end of the process; we can explain why there is such an end, and why it should be found worth marking in language” (Craig 1990: 90-91).

To sum up, Craig’s overall message is that our concept of knowledge has a history and that if we want to understand its current contours, we must make a detour through an imaginary genealogy. Under the constraints of some natural assumptions

about the kind of state of nature in which our ancestors must have found themselves, a concept of *protoknower* as a detectable good informant is likely to have arisen. *Protoknowledge* had a distinctive epistemic value: the value of having true beliefs coming from such a detectable good informant. Subsequently, the concept of *protoknowledge* underwent a conceptual development resulting in our concept of *knowledge*. Craig does not say whether our concept still delimits something of a distinctive value.

4. Objections and Modifications

I have already mentioned that Kvanvig is critical of the young Greco's and Craig's "pragmatic accounts" of the value of knowledge (2003: 83-86). Time has come to expand on his concerns. I shall distinguish between four "Kvanvagian" objections. The first two come directly from Kvanvig's *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding* (2003). The last two can not be found explicitly in Kvanvig's texts, but seem to me to be very much in his spirit. Since the four objections provide the structure for the remainder of this paper, I shall be a little pedantic in setting them out.

The *Swamping Objection* (Kvanvig 2003: 86): Craig's account of epistemic value succumbs to a version of the swamping argument against reliabilism.

Craig seeks to identify a protoknowledge-specific epistemic value. In other words, Craig holds that protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable than mere true belief. Consider the following two situations:

Situation A: Inquirer Fred has just formed the *true belief* that *p*. He has done so on the basis of testimony offered by John. Fred had previously *tagged* John as a detectably good informant on whether or not *p*.

Situation B: Inquirer Fred has just formed the *true belief* that *p*. He has done so on the basis of testimony offered by Otto. Fred did *not* previously *tag* Otto as a detectably good informant on whether or not *p*.

On Craig's account, Fred's cognitive state concerning *p* in *Situation A* is of greater epistemic value than his cognitive state concerning *p* in *Situation B*. This is because in *A*, but not in *B*, Fred got the information that *p* from a protoknower. But what does "information coming from a protoknower" mean? On Kvanvig's reading it means "information coming from someone who is objectively likely to be right about *p*". And

now it should be clear how the swamping argument kicks in. That John is an approved source of information (for Fred) regarding p might make it objectively more likely that Fred's belief that p is true. However, if Fred's belief is already true, then the objective likelihood of it being true adds nothing of epistemic value. It is difficult to see how Craig can avoid this difficulty. After all, Craig wants to tell us why protoknowledge is valuable. And in developing an answer, Craig explicitly adopts the strategy of explaining the value of protoknowledge in terms of a surplus of epistemic value, a surplus above and beyond the epistemic value of true belief (1990: 7). Craig's genealogical narrative then goes on to locate the extra value in those qualities of a given informant that make it objectively more likely that the given inquirer will get the accurate information she needs. The fact that Craig's analysis is in terms of protoknowledge rather than knowledge does not lessen or divert the difficulty.

Kvanvig's second objection is close kin to the first:

The *Conflation Objection* (Kvanvig 2003: 85): Craig's account is based on a conflation of our needs in the "context of discovery" with our needs in the "context of the final product".

Distinguish between two contexts. In the "context of discovery" we need to make out who are good informants on whether or not p . This is because we do not yet know ourselves whether or not p . And thus in the context of discovery we require the "indicator-properties" discussed by Craig. In this context the indicator-properties are of enormous value. In the "context of the final product" we already have a true belief concerning p . And since we do, we no longer have any need for indicator-properties. They are now of no value to us. Craig thinks that indicator-properties add value to a true belief. Ergo, he must be conflating the two contexts.

The *Social Objection*: Craig's account is insufficiently social in that: (a) it ignores the social consequences of (proto-)knowledge attributions; (b) it disregards the fact that the institution of testifying is a collective good; and (c) it neglects the reciprocal conceptual needs of the informant.

It is with tongue-in-cheek that I call the *Social Objection* "inspired by Kvanvig's work". And yet, I am inclined to think that the Kvanvig of 1992 – the wonderful time-slice of a man that so vehemently insisted on a social understanding of knowledge – could well have put this objection. The idea behind it is that Craig's genealogy is oddly one-sided. It centres on the conceptual needs of the inquirer but has nothing to say about the

motivations and conceptual desiderata of the informant, or about the social effects of classifying people as protoknowers. How can Craig be so sure that these aspects have not had a decisive influence on the content of the ancestors of our concept of knowledge? And why is it implausible to assume that these aspects have “left a mark” on our concept?

The *Relevance Objection*: Craig does not offer a convincing argument for why we should favour his particular genealogy over others. It is not obvious that *knowledge* bears marks of the good informant. Indeed, it is quite unclear why history would solve any problems of value-driven epistemology.

Craig never considers alternative genealogies and in support of his own he merely suggests that our concept of knowledge “still bear[s] certain marks of its origin” or that “the concept of the informant” has left “its mark, so to speak, on the concept of knowledge” (1990: 95, 97). Alas, Craig fails to identify these marks for us. However, I imagine the *Relevance Objection* to lament this point only in passing. Let us assume that Craig is right, and there really once was a community operating with the concept *protoknowledge*, a concept that delimited items united by a distinctive epistemic value. What does that tell us about the epistemic value of knowledge? The answer surely is “little, or nothing”. In order to make progress regarding the epistemic value of our concept we have to do what Kvanvig does in *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding*; we have to investigate our intuitions regarding our concept. Borrowing a line from Wittgenstein, we might ask: What is history to do with us? Ours is the first and only concept of knowledge.⁷

I am not suggesting that these four objections are the only possible ones – I shall mention some further worries in my Conclusion. But one cannot do everything at once, and thus here I shall be satisfied if I manage to weaken the appeal of the listed four. To give a brief preview of what is to come, I shall try to answer these objections in good part (though not exclusively) by modifying Craig’s genealogy. Williams, Barnes and Shapin will be crucial resources in this project. The three key modifications can already be listed here.

Modification One (inspired by Williams): Giving good information to others is a social institution and a collective good. It can exist only if it is underpinned by a network of intrinsic values.

Modification Two (inspired by Barnes and Williams): Actions of honouring and shaming are central to maintaining the institution of testifying (qua collective good). Protoknowledge attributions are attributions of honour.

Modification Three (inspired by Barnes and Shapin): Attributions of protoknowledge are intertwined with attributions of freedom: (a) Attributions of honour are attributions of freedom from (certain forms of) interference. (b) Attributions of protoknowledge are attributions of discretion over a practice. (c) Informants have the conceptual need to mark out inquirers who can be (rationally) influenced by good information. The concept of *protofreedom* plays this role.

Modification One will be important for answering the *Swamping* and the *Conflation Objections*. *Modifications Two* and *Three* will first help diffuse the *Social Objection* and then be instrumental in weakening the force of the *Relevance Objection*.

5. Excursus: In Praise of Craig

In what follows I shall increasingly deviate from Craig's original position. Nevertheless I think of this paper as *developing* rather than as *replacing* Craig's genealogy. *Knowledge and the State of Nature* has given us a new paradigm or exemplar for doing epistemology and the fact that the book has picked up few citations over the past fifteen years should not blind us as to its value and originality. One of the most valuable aspect of genealogy is its systematic use of the idea that the evolution of concepts and the development of social relations are inseparable. Every step in the evolution from *protoknowledge* to *knowledge* is explicated in terms of changed needs of the group or changed forms of interaction. For instance, Craig explains that the detectability requirement becomes diluted because people begin to recommend informants to others or because they start to engage in certain new forms of group action. The idea that conceptual and social relationships are inseparable, or "internally related", is of course not new – its most forceful articulation can be found in Peter Winch's Wittgenstein-inspired classic *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (1958).⁸ But Craig's study is the only investigation in epistemology I know of that puts this idea to good systematic use.

There are other respects too in which it is natural to think of Craig's genealogy as influenced by Wittgenstein. (I take such influence to constitute a merit.) Some interpreters of Wittgenstein have suggested that his approach to meaning and intentional

content involves three key ideas (Kripke 1982; Kusch 2006). The first is to focus on utterances in which meaning and content are attributed to others. The second recommendation counsels against trying to capture the significance of meaning-or-content attributions in terms of necessary and sufficient truth conditions. Truth-conditional analysis is to be replaced with a study of rough and ready assertability – or appropriateness – conditions. Finally, the third piece of advice urges us to ask: “What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying) the form of words [e.g. of meaning attributions] under these conditions?” (Kripke 1982: 73). Or elsewhere: “... granted that our language game permits a certain ‘move’ (assertion) under certain specifiable conditions, what is the role in our lives of such permission? Such a role must exist if this aspect of the language game is not to be idle” (Kripke 1982: 75).

There is of course much in Craig that resembles this Wittgensteinian methodology. Craig rejects an analysis of *knowledge* in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; he focuses primarily on the attribution of knowledge to others; he does not attempt to identify truth conditions for knowledge attributions; and he emphasises the importance of identifying, or hypothesising, the role, or the utility, of the concept of knowledge for us – or of *protoknowledge* for our ancestors.

Naturally, there is also an interesting parallel between Craig’s genealogy and Wittgenstein’s occasional use of simple or simplified language games. Recall for instance that the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) begin with a series of language games involving two builders. Later elements of the series are more complex than earlier ones both as far as linguistic resources and as far as forms of interaction are concerned. And yet Wittgenstein calls each stage of the series a “language”, or a “language game”, adding the qualification “primitive” for early stages (1953: §7). As these passages suggest, Wittgenstein is entirely comfortable with imaginary scenarios, even when these involve more primitive and invented scenarios. Wittgenstein speaks of these imaginary scenarios as functioning as “*objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities” (1953: §130). And he insists that “we are not engaged in natural science, and not even in natural history – since we can also surely provide fictitious natural history of our purpose” (1953: II, xii).

Finally, Craig applies Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance concepts to *knowledge*.⁹ As already mentioned, Craig rejects the notion that the meaning of knowledge can be captured in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. To this we can now add that Craig does not seek to assimilate all uses of “knowledge” to his “good informant” account. In discussing expressions like “knowing how”, “knowing people” or

“knowing places” he shows himself open to the possibility of an non-reducible variety of uses (1990: 140-61). Perhaps one should even insist that the strength of a genealogical analysis of a given term can be measured by its ability to make sense of a possibly irreducible variety of uses. If the same term can have different functions then this variety calls for an explanation. And often the best explanation will be historical – that is, genealogical. There will be reasons why it was natural for language users to have the same term cover the different functions. At the same time, it cannot be expected that the elements of the extension(s) of a family resemblance concept like knowledge all come with the same epistemic value.¹⁰

Especially as far as the last-mentioned issue of concerned, I find Craig’s methodology superior to the standard approach by epistemologists, an approach that is well represented by Kvanvig (2003). Kvanvig is eager to distinguish between those uses of “knowledge” that are “central to epistemological inquiry, related as it is to theoretical concerns” and those uses that are not. The borderline he has in mind coincides with the divide between factive and non-factive uses of “knowledge”. As Kvanvig has it, utterances of the form “it used to be known that the earth is flat” are instances of “misspeaking” typical of “undergraduates” at the beginning of their philosophical education (2003: xi, 190); expressions of the form “I just *knew* I was going to fail” (when the speaker in fact succeeded) conflate knowledge and psychological certainty; and locutions involving the “current state of scientific knowledge”, or “talk about the present state of knowledge (even though we know that some of what falls under that rubric is false)” are merely “honorific” (Kvanvig 2003: 201; Kvanvig forthcoming: 6). Kvanvig goes so far as to say that “if I were to offer a theory of knowledge, I would not expect it to answer to locutions involving the current state of scientific knowledge”. Kvanvig takes such honorific uses to belong not to the semantics but to the “pragmatic dimension of epistemic terminology” (forthcoming: 6).

I shall return to the issue of “honorific uses” below. Here I am more interested in Kvanvig’s excluding of “misspeaking”, that is, his excluding of “undergraduates” talk of past and rejected knowledge. This case is interesting for us since Kvanvig is wrong in confining such uses of the term “knowledge” for past institutionalised or past taken-for-granted beliefs to ignorant undergraduates. Historians and sociologists of knowledge employ the term very much in the same way – and have done so at least since the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g. Durkheim 1983, Bloor 1991; Shapin 1994). To accuse generations of social scientists of misspeaking on the grounds that their use is not that favoured by mainstream epistemology strikes me as a misplaced attempt at linguistic legislating. Equally importantly, to dismiss these uses of “knowledge” as

simple mistakes is to block one's view to what sociologists might be able to contribute to one's own enterprise.

Lest this disagreement just sounds like a clash of intuitions, note that Kvanvig's two criteria for excluding non-factive uses of "knowledge" are not compelling. According to the first criterion, non-factive uses are "[not] central to epistemological inquiry, related as it is to theoretical concerns". This is not unconvincing. Clearly the non-factive use of "knowledge" favoured by social scientists is very much "related to theoretical concerns". Social scientists aim to develop theories that explain why certain types of belief – or indeed, certain types of *knowledge* – are found credible in certain types of communities. So Kvanvig better have a different reading of his criterion. The only other reading I can think of is to interpret "theoretical concerns" as "concerns with the truth of the beliefs". Alas, this reading of "theoretical concerns" renders the whole argument circular; it boils down to saying that non-factive uses should be ignored because they are not factive.

Kvanvig's second attempt at linguistic purification distinguishes between the semantics and pragmatics of "knowledge". Factive uses belong in the former, non-factive uses in the latter. This dividing line is not helpful either. Debating it properly would take us back to the debate whether G. E. Moore's "I know I have a hand" is a meaningful statement. Moore (1993: Chs. 7, 9, 13) and later Paul Grice (1989), John Searle (1969) and Keith DeRose (1997) famously argue that the statement has meaning and thus is true or false; this is so, they maintain, since "know" (and the other words occurring in the utterance) have a context-independent determinate meaning. Norman Malcolm (1949, 1977), Wittgenstein (1969) and, more recently, Charles Travis (1991), have supported the opposite view; to wit, that there is no sensible distinction between the semantics and pragmatics of knowledge attributions, and that hence, without a specified context, Moore's utterance is meaningless. If the latter view is right, then Kvanvig's second go at conceptual cleansing fails as well.

5. Modification One: Williams on Testimony, Free-Riding, and Intrinsic Values

Williams' book *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (2002) adjusts Craig's genealogical method in one crucial respect.¹¹ According to Williams, Craig's "imaginary genealogy" cannot be the whole story; it needs to be complimented by "real genealogy", that is, by an engagement with historical and cultural contingent realities. Williams insists that in moving from imaginary to real genealogy we do not leave philosophy behind: "... philosophy cannot be too pure if it really wants to do what it sets out to do" (2002: 39). At the same time, Williams defends the role of *imaginary* genealogy.

Imaginary genealogy is crucial for making sense of the possibility of the development of “cultural phenomena” in those cases where the historical record contains no helpful data – we cannot identify a past or present community that did not “always already” have these cultural phenomena (2002: 35).

Although Williams does not put it in these very terms, it is inviting to read his book as offering an imaginary and real genealogy of the cultural phenomenon of testimony. Thus Williams shares with Craig both the subject matter and (much of) the method. But whereas Craig focuses on *concepts*, Williams is more interested in the details of the *values, motivations and virtues* that underpin the phenomenon. According to Williams, the central virtues of testifiers are “accuracy” and “sincerity”. Accuracy refers to an individual’s disposition to seek out the truth and to report it in a way that is sensitive to the recipient’s circumstances, needs and abilities. Unlike Craig, Williams does not take it for granted that individuals in the state of nature are co-operative and eager to offer information to others. Williams recognises that the *institution of testimony* – as I shall subsequently call it – is a collective good. Individuals who are rational in a purely self-interested way will try to “free-ride”: they will seek to obtain accurate and sincere testimony from others without offering anything in return. After all, collecting useful information usually involves costly “investigative investments” (2002: 88).

How is the problem of collective action solved? The core of Williams’ solution to the Free-Rider Problem concerning the institution of testimony is the suggestion that accuracy and sincerity (and with them the institution itself) must come to be regarded by community members as *shared intrinsic* – rather than as merely *instrumental* – values (2002: 90). For community members to have trust in each others’ reports, they must be convinced that accuracy and sincerity are non-negotiable. And this implies that these values are not – except under extreme circumstances – weighed against, and possibly outweighed by, other interests and values. As Williams sees it, to say that accuracy and sincerity cannot be weighed against other interests and values is to say that accuracy and sincerity cannot be rendered instrumentally. The uses of instruments are routinely assessed as to their costs and benefits, and arguments in favour of their use can always be outweighed by other considerations. Williams also emphasises that adherence to accuracy and sincerity must be “stable under reflection” (2002: 91). It is not enough that everyone merely “pretends” to have adopted accuracy and sincerity as intrinsic values. Pretence too can be outweighed. And finally intrinsic values must make sense to the agent “from the inside, so to speak: it must be possible for them to relate trustworthiness to other things that they value, and to their ethical emotions” (2002: 91-2).

The expression “relate trustworthiness to other things that they value” points us to the fact that Williams’ solution to the Free Rider Problem involves an interpretation of

intrinsic value that differs fundamentally from the well-known conception proposed in G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1993). Moore famously believed that we identify intrinsic value by "the method of absolute isolation": "it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed *by themselves*, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good" (1993: 236-7). Against Moore, Williams holds that values come in socially shared webs and systems, that intrinsic values occupy a central position in such webs or systems, and that values make sense only in their essential relations to one another. Given the significance of this viewpoint for much of what follows, it is worth quoting the central passage at some length:

What we want ... is some insight into these values, some account of their relations to other things that we know that we need and value, but an insight which does not reduce them to the merely instrumental. What we want ... is explanation without reduction ... (2002: 90). ... it is in fact a sufficient condition for something (for instance, trustworthiness) to have an intrinsic value that, first, it is necessary (or nearly necessary) for basic human purposes and needs that human beings should treat it as an intrinsic good; and, second, they can coherently treat it as an intrinsic good. This means that it is stable under reflection ... What is essential for this to be so is that the agent has some materials in terms of which he can understand this value in relation to other values that he holds, and this implies, in turn, that the intrinsic good (in this case trustworthiness), or rather the agent's relation to it, has an inner structure in terms of which it can be related to other goods (2002: 92).

Williams' view of intrinsic values relates directly to his distinction between imaginary and real genealogies. While no community can exist without values like accuracy and sincerity, different communities embed such values in different "wider range[s] of values". And what these wider ranges of values are, "varies from time to time and culture to culture" (2002: 93). The bulk of Williams' study is an investigation into the links between trustworthiness and other values in the Western tradition. I shall take up one such link below: the link between trustworthiness and freedom.

6. Modification One as a Reply to the Swamping Objection

Modification One adds to Craig's genealogy the ideas that the institution of testifying is a collective good and that this institution and the virtues underpinning it are of intrinsic value to group members. I shall now show that *Modification One* enables us to answer

Kvanvig's *Swamping* and *Conflation Objections*. As Kvanvig has it, Craig's work on protoknowledge seems to come down to the following claim: protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable than mere true belief since protoknowledge is true belief produced by an informant who is objectively likely to produce true beliefs in her audiences or recipients. Alas, whatever the epistemic value of this objective likelihood, it is swamped by the epistemic value of the true belief. The reason why the objective likelihood is swamped in this way is that it is of instrumental value only. The detectably good informant is an instrument – is of instrumental value – for achieving true beliefs. But once the goal has been reached, the instrument's value is cancelled out, and only the value of the goal remains.

Kvanvig considers two ways of avoiding the swamping problem in the context of justification. One way is to give justification an intrinsic value, the other way is to make justification extrinsically but non-instrumentally valuable. Kvanvig dismisses the first idea on the grounds that we just cannot make sense of justification as valuable in isolation, that is, in isolation from having true beliefs. And, as previously summarised (2c) Kvanvig accepts the notion that justification is extrinsically but non-instrumentally valuable.

Williams' account of collective action on behalf of the institution of testimony in general, and his new understanding of intrinsic value in particular, decisively changes the balance of arguments between Craig and Kvanvig. First, if Williams is right to insist that the institution of testimony is a collective good *supported by intrinsic values*, then the swamping argument begins to dry out. Conceived along the lines suggested by Williams' analysis, the institution of testimony is not of merely instrumental value. Its very existence is of central *intrinsic* value to us. To see talking to others – and that includes: informing them and being informed by them – as of merely instrumental value is to lose hold of much of our value system. It is to begin a process of radically redefining who we are. Put differently, *there is* a value gap between true belief and protoknowledge: protoknowledge is true belief produced (or made likely) by the institution of testimony, an institution that is of epistemic and non-epistemic value to us both as a tool for reaching true beliefs and as something that makes us – as knowers, as believers, as humans – what we are. Second, if Williams is right to maintain that intrinsic values cannot be identified via Moore's method of absolute isolation, if Williams is correct to hold that intrinsic values are intelligible and reflectively stable only in relation to one another, then even Kvanvig's argument against justification as an intrinsic value no longer appears compelling. Justification can be an intrinsic value despite the fact that its value is related to the value of true belief.

Of course all of this depends on whether, concerning intrinsic value, Williams is right, and Kvanvig and Moore are wrong. To properly adjudicate this question would demand a separate lengthy investigation. Here I can offer no more than crass appeals to the reader's intuition and my own introspection. Consider the list of intrinsic values once compiled by William Frankena:

life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one's own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honor, esteem, etc. (Frankena 1973: 87-88; quoted from Zimmerman 2004).

Ask yourself the question of how you make sense of the valuable character of these items. Is it by means of Moore's "method of absolute isolation" or is it by means of Williams' network test? If you are at all like me, then the answer will be "the latter". It is not just that I spontaneously use the Williams' method; I am not even sure how to make sense of the method of absolute isolation regarding intrinsic values like love, freedom, peace or, indeed, knowledge. The moment I begin to reflect on what makes any of these valuable, I find myself pulled and pushed towards further items on Frankena's list.

7. Modification Two: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge and Honouring

Williams teaches that the collective good of the testimonial institution can exist only if the virtues of accuracy and sincerity (amongst others) become intrinsic values. But how can communities make sure that their members look upon these virtues as intrinsic values? Williams has an answer to this problem as well. He tells us that "people may be discouraged or encouraged, sanctioned, shamed, or rewarded with respect to this" (2002: 44), that a crucial motivation is the "fear ... of disgrace in one's own eyes, and in the eyes of people whom one respects and who one hopes will respect oneself" (2002: 116), that "the motivations of honour and shame play an important part" (2002: 120), and that the structure "of mutual respect and the capacity for shame in the face of oneself and others, is a traditional, indeed archaic, ethical resource, but it is still very necessary" (2002: 121). In a nutshell, Williams' idea is that a system of sanctioning – of honouring

and dishonouring – encourages community members to constitute and maintain the institution of testimony and thus the virtues of accuracy and sincerity.

Here one might be tempted to complain that Williams in fact explains one collective good in terms of another. Is not sanctioning on behalf of the institution of testimony itself a collective good? And does not its existence pose exactly the same sorts of problems as were posed by the existence of the institution of testimony? Why don't individuals seek to free-ride on the institution of sanctioning? It is surprising to note that Williams does not see this problem.

Fortunately though, there is a response to this worry. This response was developed by the sociologist of knowledge Barry Barnes in a different context. Barnes' proposal is best appreciated against the background of other proposed solutions to Free Rider Problems. The first standard type of solution is the *individualism* of Rational Choice Theory. According to this conception, the tendency of self-interested rational individuals to free-ride can be held in check by offering additional and selective benefits. (Self-interested rational car-owners would buy catalytic converters if the government gave them special tax-credits.) The second type of solution is *functionalism* or *normative determinism*: individuals cooperate because they have internalised the same norms, and thus have developed the same dispositions to act. There is widespread agreement that neither of these solutions works. Individualism is refuted by the empirical observation that we often engage in collective action even when no selective benefits are in sight. Voting in general elections is a case in point. Functionalism suffers from the inability to explain the psychological processes underlying internalisation, and from failing to explain how individuals can meaningfully apply internalised norms under various circumstances (Barnes 1995: Chapters 1-2).

The problems besetting individualism and functionalism have increased the attractiveness of a third solution to social order problems: "interactionism". Barnes defends a version of this view. The key move of this approach is to deny that interacting with other – talking and sanctioning for example – are costly "instrumentalities". Basic features of social interaction are, as it were, "free" resources; that is, resources to which normally no costs can meaningfully be attached. Talking to others about things we (should) value, reminding them of the importance of our collectively beneficial institutions, and sanctioning them in cases of non-compliance are things we do without much calculation. It is in our nature to engage in these activities. This highly plausible element of interactionism can help to deflect the cart-before-the-horse objection to Williams' proposal that a system of sanctioning helps to establish the testimonial system. If the sanctioning is a free resource then no circularity is involved.

It is worth adding that Barnes, like Williams, gives a central role to honour, shame and related emotions. Sanctioning in support of the collective good works through the “deference-emotion system” (Barnes 1995: 72-3, 82-3, Scheff 1988). The precondition of this system is our emotional need to continuously monitor how others treat us and think of us. We respond to our assessments of this treatment by changing our position on an internal scale that ranges from pride to shame. When we believe that others treat us with deference, when we believe that others honour us, we feel pride (and related feelings) and move ourselves up on the pride-shame scale. When we suspect that such deference and honouring are missing, we tend to feel bad about ourselves and slide downwards towards the shame end of the scale. This emotional dependence on others is exploited by the deference-emotion system. The granting or withholding of deference constitutes a subtle system of social sanctions, a system that we barely notice. And the operation of the deference-emotion system is inseparable from our ongoing conversation about the collective good. Working with and through the deference-emotion system this conversation continuously re-establishes the importance of the collective good in everyone’s mind.

So far in this section I have sought to explain – following Barnes – that honouring on behalf of the collective good of the testimonial system is a free resource. With this proposal in place, I can now introduce a slightly more original move. This is the idea that attributions of (proto-)knowledge (and their cognates) play a key role in the collective action that constitutes the institution of testimony. They do so by *honouring* the informants. In keeping with the genealogical method, let us first see how the link between protoknowledge attributions and honouring works under the simplified conditions of the state of nature. To publicly apply the concept *protoknower* to someone is not only to classify them as a reliable source of information, it is also to honour them, or to encourage others to do likewise. To classify someone as a protoknower is to praise them for their contribution to the institution of testimony, and thereby for their contribution to the well-being of the community itself. After all, the community cannot survive without the institution of testimony. By means of attributions of protoknowledge members of the community honour good informants for contributing their part to the existing and flourishing of the community. *Mutatis mutandis*, withholding or denying protoknowledge is a way of censoring and dishonouring. It is to mark someone as not willing, not worthy or not able to participate in the constitution of the collective good, and thus as not fit to be a (working) part of the group. In that sense, to deny someone *protoknowledge* is to expel them from the group.

My suggestion connects together Craig’s focus on conceptual needs of the inquirer with Williams’ emphasis on the motivational problems of the informants. By

using the concept of protoknowledge to both classify and honour informants, the inquirer manages to serve two key goals at one and the same time: the goal of tagging good informants for future reference (to herself and others), and the goal of motivating community members to make, or keep making, investigative investments.

8. *Modification Two as a Partial Reply to the Social and Relevance Objections*

It should be obvious that *Modification Two* addresses the *Social Objection* at least in part. We are no longer just focusing on the conceptual needs of the inquirer but also on the motivational needs – the need for honour – of the informant. At the same time, it is clear that we have only *begun* to make progress in correcting for the one-sidedness of Craig’s state-of-nature scenario. We shall make further headway once we turn to *Modification Three*.

The *Relevance Objection* expresses doubts about the use of state-of-nature stories for understanding our own concepts – in particular it is sceptical of the possibility that narratives about *protoknowledge* help us to illuminate features of *knowledge*. Proponents of this objections demand the see the “marks” of *protoknowledge* in our concept.

My main concern in this section is to show that such marks are visible as far as the honouring aspect of protoknowledge attributions is concerned. But before I turn to this issue, it seems worth pointing out that Craig could reasonably invoke linguistic evidence for the claim that *knowledge* has (some of its central) roots in the idea of testifying. There is for instance the observation that “to know” (and its cognates) takes interrogative constructions as complements. The same is not true for “to believe” (and its cognates). Compare e.g.

1. I know who she is. She knows where to go. He knows when to come.

*2. I believe who she is. She believes where to go. He believes when to come.

The sentences in 1 are all well formed, those in *2 are not. This observation has prompted one communitarian epistemologist to claim that “we use the notion of knowledge in describing our aims when we address questions to other people” (Welbourne 1993: 9; cf. Vendler 1979, Kusch 2002). Or consider the frequent use of the metaphor of testimonial transmission (or its failures) in processes of learning and knowing:

3. The tyre tracks *tell* us that the assassin arrived by car after it rained.
4. The appearance of a distant ship's mast before its hull *shows* that the Earth's surface is not flat but curved.
5. I couldn't *believe* my eyes.
6. I refused to believe the *testimony of my senses*.
7. Two cemeteries *bear witness* to the congregation's history.
8. Unless my ears *deceive* me, my daughter is crying downstairs.
9. Jones is very well *informed* about this insect: he has studied it for years.

3 is one example of the many cases where non-human things are treated as testifiers. It usually is evidence that tells us things. In such cases “show” is a near synonym (cf. 4). While less obviously a testimony word than “tell”, “show” still carries the implication of someone showing you something. But used in its common metaphor it is again evidence showing you something. Interestingly enough, the classical Greek word for evidence (*martyrion*) derives directly from the Greek word for witness (*martyrs*) (Lloyd 1979: 252-3). 9 is interesting given that the term “informant” plays such key role in Craig's account. We say that someone is well informed even when there has been *no person* doing the informing. Note that similar comments could also be made about many other terms relating to inquiry or cognition. For instance, “discovery” first meant the act of revealing something one already knows to someone else. Only later did it come to refer to one's own encounter with something heretofore unknown (Bennett 2002). And “intelligence” means both a property of the capacity to understand and reason, and the conveyance of information. (Hence the joke that “military intelligence” is an oxymoron.) (Schaffer 1994).¹²

Returning to my main concern of using *Modification Two* as a partial reply to the *Relevance Objection*, I cannot here present linguistic evidence for the honouring function of knowledge attributions. To bring out this function demands a detailed study of the context of the utterance, and there is no room for this here. But fortunately there is other evidence, too; there is the evidence of the intuitions and hypotheses of epistemologists and sociologists of knowledge. In using such data, I am once more following and developing Craig's lead. He writes that “we can include amongst our *explananda* ... the various analyses of the concept of knowledge that philosophers have given” (1990: 6-7).

First, in one of the perhaps most fruitful uses of Craig's and Williams' work to date, Miranda Fricker (1998) has argued in defence of the category of “epistemic injustice”. It is epistemically unjust when someone with a true belief on whether or not *p* is not allowed to testify concerning *p*. Examples of such epistemic injustice are racist

societies in which, say, blacks or Jews are barred from appearing as witnesses in court, or sexist societies in which even when, say, the experiences of menstruation or childbirth are in question, the opinion of the male doctor counts for more than the reports of women. Fricker is entirely right to speak of epistemic injustice in such cases. But I would like to add a footnote. The footnote is that to deny members of ethnic minorities and women the status of knowers involves more than a purely epistemic injustice – it is more than a misclassification. To deny these groups the status of knowers is to *dishonour* them and to exclude them from full membership in the community. That denials of knowledge have this function is evidence for the claim that (many) knowledge attributions carry an element of honouring.

Second, various virtue epistemologists have emphasised either or both of the following ideas: that to attribute knowledge to someone is to declare them deserving of “credit” (Sosa 1991; Greco 2004, 2005; Riggs 2002), and that any “separation of knowledge from moral concerns” is unhelpful and misleading (Zagzebski 1996: 336). I do not need to say much about the former point: it is obvious that to give someone “credit” for the way in which they have arrived at their true belief is to honour them in some way.¹³ Concerning the latter point Linda Zagzebski summarises her argument in the following passage:

Virtue is a heavily social concept ... Knowledge is the result of acts of intellectual virtue by both the agent and others in her epistemic community upon whom she relies in forming a subset of her beliefs. This aspect of knowledge makes it something for which we have social responsibility. And, in fact, it is one of the main reasons knowledge is something for which we are *morally* responsible. Others in our society have the moral right to expect us not to harm them, and passing on to them something that is not knowledge is one way of harming them (1996: 319).

Zagzebski links epistemology and ethics via the idea that not to exercise one’s intellectual virtues is often to expose others to harm. This point reinforces the link between knowledge attributions and honouring. We honour good informants not just because of the abstract consideration that they help maintain the collective good of the testimonial system. The collective good of the testimonial system is somewhat distal from our ordinary everyday point of view. More proximate is the insight that the good informant (often) helps us to avoid harm or enables us to fulfil our desires. Thus the honour we bestow is not exclusively epistemic – it is both epistemic and moral at the same time.

Third, recall that Kvanvig speaks of so-called “honorific” uses of “knowledge”: uses such as “the current state of scientific knowledge”. Kvanvig thinks that sometimes we wish to pay a special compliment to certain systems of beliefs that, although they contain falsehoods, have been assembled through praiseworthy epistemic efforts. When used honorifically, “knowledge” refers to something which in fact is not knowledge, but which resembles knowledge in respects that we find worth honouring. Here I shall not raise the question whether Kvanvig is right to insist that “the current state of scientific knowledge” refers to something which is not really knowledge. At this point I only wish to stress that Kvanvig’s proposal – albeit in a distorted form – confirms my suggestion according to which knowledge attributions often contain an element of honouring.

Fourth, and finally, the mentioned links between knowledge, morality, credit and honour are a frequent topic in the sociology of knowledge. For instance, in lectures criticising the individualism of William James’ pragmatism, no-one less than Émile Durkheim once wrote of the “moral obligation” to acquire knowledge: “Truth cannot be separated from a certain moral character. In every age, men have felt that they *were obliged* to seek truth” (1983: 73). “We feel obliged to adhere to truth. We see our certainty as something that is not personal to us, and that it is to be shared by all men” (1983: 101). David Bloor makes a similar point when he suggests that scientific knowledge can be analysed in terms of the Durkheimian category of “the sacred” (1991: 51-3).

9. Modification Three: Barnes and Shapin on Knowledge and Freedom

Modification Three is influenced by Barnes’ social theory of freedom and Steven Shapin’s social-historical work on testimony and gentlemen in seventeenth-century English natural philosophy (Barnes 2000; Shapin 1994). *Modification Three* is concerned with the ways in which attributions of freedom are intertwined with attributions of knowledge. To repeat, the three crucial claims are: (a) Attributions of honour are attributions of freedom from (certain forms of) interference. (b) Attributions of protoknowledge are attributions of discretion over a practice. (c) Informants have the conceptual need to mark our inquirers who can be (rationally) influenced by good information. The concept of *protofreedom* plays this role. – I shall take these three claims in turn.

Re (a): To honour someone is to give them a status that increases their chances of not being interfered with by other members of the community. The higher the honorific status of a group member, the smaller the range of others who can tell her what to do.

This should not be a controversial claim. After all, dictionary entries on “honour” link it to respect, esteem, reverence, deference, approbation and high rank. All these concepts concern a status that protects one – at least to a degree – from being controlled and directed by others. I have previously suggested that attributions of protoknowledge do honour to the testifier. It therefore follows that attributions of protoknowledge confer a (culturally and contextually varying) degree of freedom. One important form of non-interference that comes with the status of (proto-)knower is protection from the demand to investigate things further. If we attribute to Fred the knowledge that *p*, then we accept that there is no further room to negotiate whether or not *p* (Lynch 1993: 76). Or, as Kvanvig puts it: “One of the platitudes about the functional role of knowledge ascriptions is that it is a legitimator of inquiry closure. Nothing similar can be said about belief, true belief, or justified or virtuous true belief” (Kvanvig, forthcoming, 12). (In passing I add two further links between knowledge, honour and freedom. First, *honour* is due primarily, or perhaps even exclusively, for actions that people *freely* chose to do, honour is due only for actions of which the actors *knew* what they were doing. Second, no group member can occupy a status of honour in a group unless all, or at least most, group members know of it. Indeed, it is the knowledge of the status that constitutes it in the first place. To occupy a social status is to be known to occupy it.)

Re (b): Assume in our state-of-nature community Nick is the best informant about where to find the tastiest wild mushrooms. It surely would then be a good idea to give Nick discretion over our practices of mushroom hunting. This will maximise our chances of getting the delicatessen we want, and it will show Nick additional respect. I suggest generalising the point by saying that attributions of protoknowledge come with the acknowledgement that the testifier has at least a *prima facie* case for directing our practices in the relevant area. Put differently, when Fred attributes protoknowledge to Nick he thereby restricts his own discretion in favour of Nick’s.

Re (c): Claims (a) and (b) both deal with the social consequences of protoknowledge attributions. Suggestion (c) tries to remove an *asymmetry* in Craig’s treatment of the inquirer-informant interaction. Craig’s theoretical focus is exclusively on the conceptual needs of inquirers, that is, on their needs to tag good informants. Alas, Craig has nothing to say on the corresponding conceptual needs of informants, that is, on their needs to tag good inquirers (i.e. recipients). However, in the absence of any argument to the contrary, it seems likely that both sets of concepts, or both conceptual needs, have left their marks on our understanding of key epistemic terms and their interrelations.

What distinction regarding good and bad inquirers should be important to informants? This is where my train of thought makes contact with Barnes' social theory of free will and determinism (2000). In a thought experiment that is genealogical in all but name, Barnes asks us to consider what kinds of action and decision classifications must be important to highly gregarious and socially interdependent creatures like us. A little reflection shows that such creatures must find it important to distinguish between two kinds of decisions by others: decisions by others they can influence by means of verbal interventions; and decisions by others that they cannot so influence. I can bring about your decision to fetch me a glass of water by asking for it or by explaining how important the water is to me. "Fetching a glass of water" is a type of action that typically can be brought about by symbolic intervention. However, if you are pathologically obsessive about washing your hands, then typically I cannot stop you from doing so by asking you to stop. Your decision to wash your hand thus falls on the other side of the divide. Barnes suggests that we see our distinctions between voluntary and involuntary actions, and between free and coerced decisions, in light of the distinction between decisions that can be influenced by communication, and decisions that can not be so influenced. What – at least in the simplified situation of state-of-nature scenario – unifies our criteria for attributing free decisions and voluntary actions is the idea of being susceptible to verbal intervention. A careful look at the decisions that we end up classifying as either free or coerced suggests that susceptibility to change on the basis of symbolic intervention is central. Put differently, it seems that for us a decision is free if it "could have been otherwise if symbolic intervention had occurred" (Barnes 2000: 73).

Barnes is not primarily concerned with the conceptual needs of informants in tagging good and bad recipients or audiences. But of course the point carries over. If *protoknowledge* is the concept for picking out good informants, *protofreedom* is the concept for tagging good recipients. The protofree recipient of testimony is open to the information conveyed to her, and willing and able to modify her behaviour in predictable ways in its light. Take Nick, our (state-of-nature) informant on the location of tasty mushrooms. Assume that Nick can give his information either to Fred or to Otto. Fred is notorious for his inability to act in predictable (i.e. rational) ways. Tell Fred that a mushroom is safe to eat, and he will throw it away. Let Fred know that a mushroom is poisonous, and he will run over to your children to let them bite off a piece. Compare Fred with Otto. Otto is thankfully predictable and makes precisely the use of information that Nick would expect. According to the proposal made here, Nick will find it important to tag Otto and Fred in different ways: Otto as protofree, Fred as proto-unfree. I write "protofree" rather than "free" since it would clearly be contentious to claim that *protofreedom* is identical with our *freedom*. Barnes only makes the weaker claim that

our *freedom* (with all its surrounding conflicting intuitions) has developed out *protofreedom*. This genealogy lies beyond the scope of this paper.

10. Modification Three as a Further Reply to the Social and Relevance Objections

It hardly merits mentioning that *Modification Three* immunises genealogy against the *Social Objection*. After all, *Modification Three* develops genealogy in exactly those respects in which the *Social Objection* detects a deficit. Hence I shall here concentrate on the contribution of *Modification Three* to the question of relevance.

I want to address this question by trying my hand at linking together imaginary and real genealogy. In doing so I seek to improve on Williams' vague hints concerning a link between knowledge and freedom. Picking up on themes in Primo Levi's reflections on natural science, Williams insists that to lie to another person is to violate their freedom; that to follow the "dictates" of nature is not to be un-free; and that the "freedom to believe the truth must be shared" (2002: 146). Williams does not tell us whether these links are the product of real or imaginary genealogy.

My central source of inspiration here is Shapin's study *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (1994).¹⁴ Shapin studies the role of testimony and gentility in the shaping of the investigative culture of English natural philosophy during the lifetime of Robert Boyle. In order to highlight the general relevance of Shapin's study for our concerns here, I need hardly do more than quote parts of one of its key early paragraphs:

Knowledge is a collective good. In securing our knowledge we rely upon others, and we cannot dispense with that reliance. That means that the relations in which we have and hold our knowledge have a moral character ... [T]he fabric of our social relations is made of knowledge – not just knowledge of other people, but also knowledge of what the world is like – and, similarly, ... our knowledge of what the world is like draws on knowledge about other people – what they are like as sources of testimony, whether and in what circumstances they may be trusted (1994: xxv-xxvi).

In the present context I want to highlight a single central theme of Shapin's book: the notion that in order to be a good and reliable testifier – and thus in order to be a fully trustworthy producer of knowledge – one must be free. Natural philosophers of seventeenth-century England accepted – notwithstanding the Royal Society's motto "*Nullius in verba*" (on no man's word) – that testimony was needed to make natural

knowledge, and that finding good testifiers was a difficult practical problem. Seventeenth-century literature on the topic suggested any number of maxims, such as “(i) assent to testimony which is plausible; (ii) assent to testimony which is multiple” or “(iii) assent to testimony which is consistent” (1994: 212). Alas, no sooner was a maxim proposed that critics found it to be of only limited help. For instance, maxim (i) could potentially and incorrectly exclude true reports that conflicted with dominant false beliefs; maxim (ii) was of limited value in cases where the multiple reports derived from one another; or maxim (iii) did not account for the experience that “too great a display of internal consistency” might be sign “that a polished performance had been prepared” (1994: 233). Only one maxim was never challenged: “assent to testimony from sources of acknowledged integrity and disinterestedness” (1994: 212). On first sight, this might not sound like a helpful maxim; how were practitioners of the new science supposed to know who the disinterested reporters were?

This is where gentility and freedom became important. Shapin’s major historical thesis is that “English experimental philosophy ... emerged partly through the purposeful relocation of the conventions, codes, and values of gentlemanly conversation into the domain of natural philosophy” (1994: xvii). And one of the central beliefs about the gentleman was that he was a natural truth-teller. The gentleman was thought to be a natural truth-teller primarily on the grounds of his possessing a special “disinterestedness” (1994: 83). This disinterestedness was in good part taken to derive from the gentleman’s economic circumstances. As Henry Peacham put it in his influential treatise *The Complete Gentleman* at the time: “whosoever labour for their livelihood and gain have no share at all in nobility or gentry” (Shapin 1994: 50). In other words, to be a gentleman was to be financially independent and secure. And a life that was independent and secure in this sense was equated with a free life. The overarching thought linking freedom, gentry and testimony together was thus as follows: “Gentlemen were truth-tellers because nothing could work upon them that would induce them to be otherwise” (1994: 84).

The conventions of gentlemanly experimental philosophy did not allow for anyone to openly express disbelief in a report coming from a gentleman. The situation was very different for all those who did not make the gentry grade: women, servants, “the poor and the mean in general”, merchants, Catholics, Continental gentry, Italians and politicians. In the cases of all of these groups, their “unreliable truthfulness ... was pervasively referred to their constrained circumstances” (1994: 86). This obviously did not mean that no-one but a gentleman was ever believed: given that much of, say, Boyle’s experimental work was carried out by “domestics” such wide-spread distrust would have destroyed the whole enterprise of natural philosophy. One has to see the link

between freedom and truthfulness as a resource: citing the constrained circumstances of domestics-technicians was a way in which a gentleman could explain experimental failures. And whatever information the domestics produced, it became knowledge, and thus a property of the gentlemanly community of natural philosophers, only once it was vouched for by Boyle (or another gentleman) (1994: Ch. 8).

I hope that this briefest of summaries of Shapin's central theme makes convincing that his *Social History of Truth* qualifies as a "real genealogy" by Williams' criteria. After all, Shapin shows us how a conceptual link between freedom and testimony, or indeed freedom *and knowledge*, was articulated in a period that was formative of natural science as it evolved over the past three-hundred years. Clearly, Shapin's book – and investigations like it (e.g. Shapin and Schaffer 1985) – are relevant for our understanding of (scientific) knowledge today. Although they do not help much with solutions to the Gettier problem, or the dispute between externalism and internalism, they help us understand why, say, we have our present intuitions about the links between freedom and testimony, or why testimony lies at the heart of our thinking about knowledge.

One way to measure the interest of imaginary genealogy is to ask whether it can make a helpful contribution to a better understanding of Shapin's results. It seems obvious to me that indeed it can. Consider first the suggestion that to attribute protoknowledge is to attribute honour, freedom and social power (i.e. discretion over a social practice). Reading Shapin's observations in the light of this suggestion helpfully highlights the correct "direction of fit" between knowledge and freedom. It would be superficial to think that gentlemen excluded women, domestics, Italians, and so on, from the category of knowledge-makers on the grounds that these latter groups were constrained in their circumstances and hence not free. This reading of the situation treats freedom and lack thereof as if they were natural states one just happened to find oneself in, natural states that have nothing to do with human actions. Combining my imaginary genealogy with the realities of a stratified or class society invites a different rendering. Precisely because knowledge attributions come with (a degree of) honour, freedom and social power, members of an upper class or caste will always be (*prima facie*) reluctant to ascribe knowledge to members of a lower class or caste. Denying knowledge is a way of dishonouring and keeping someone in their disempowered "station". Or reflect on the further proposal coming from my imaginary genealogy, according to which testifiers prefer recipients who are free, that is, who are being likely to be able, and have the means, to use the transmitted information in a way intended by the testifier. Again, it should not be thought that the gentlemen "found" – through empirical observation of their stratified society – that domestics, women and Italians lacked these means. On the

contrary, through their actions gentlemen made sure that these and other marginalised or suppressed groups would not acquire the needed tools for knowledge making.

To sum up my discussion of *Modification Three* and the *Relevance Objection*, Craig's imaginary genealogy – enriched by a broader communitarian perspective – is important for understanding *our concept of knowledge*. One move in making it relevant is to connect it appropriately with real genealogies of our knowledge practices. Imaginary genealogy can add insight and depth to the real genealogies by providing explanations based upon the speculative material of the state of nature.

11. Conclusions and Loose Ends

In this paper I have tried to give substance to the idea of a communitarian value-driven epistemology. In order to make transparent how this project might slot into more familiar, or more mainstream, projects, I have throughout maintained a critical dialogue with Kvanvig's position. The communitarian value-driven epistemology I favour, starts from the fact that human knowers are highly gregarious and deeply interdependent, and draws on traditions usually ignored by epistemologists: Craig's and Williams' epistemic genealogy and the sociology of knowledge. The core of this paper was an attempt to develop Craig's genealogical study of the value of knowledge. Four "Kvanvagian" objections to Craig – two taken from, two inspired by, Kvanvig's work – pointed the way. The objections were that Craig's imaginary genealogy falls to the swamping argument; that "pragmatic accounts" conflate the context of discovery with the context of the final product; that Craig's state of nature is insufficiently social; and that Craig's overall quasi-historical theory is irrelevant to an understanding our present epistemic concepts. I sought to block all four objections by means of a number of modifications of Craig's original story: by treating the institution of testimony as a collective good underwritten by the intrinsic and interrelated values of accuracy and sincerity; by rendering protoknowledge attributions as ascriptions of honour; and by allowing attributions of protoknowledge to be intertwined with attributions of freedom. The view that emerged was that the core of our knowledge practices are institutions of testimony, and that these practices are a collective good.

I am painfully aware that this paper is no more than a beginning, or a research proposal more than a finished piece of work, and that it begs numerous important questions. I conclude by listing a few further objections that should receive more proper treatment elsewhere. I shall indicate in each case the directions in which I hope a successful answer will lie.

Objection A: It is easy to see that knowledge is not a collective good. Take a familiar collective good like clean air. Clean air is a collective good insofar as its costs are carried individually while its benefits are enjoyed collectively. Clean air can exist only if most of us invest into pollution-reducing technologies. But once clean air exists, everyone – regardless of their investment, or lack thereof – is able to breathe it. This is of course why collective action – that is, the action that creates and sustains collective goods – is always threatened by free-riding. Knowledge is not like clean air. There are plenty of things each one of us can learn and know without getting help from anyone else. For example, I do not need anyone’s help in order to gain perceptual, memorial or inferential knowledge. Moreover, it is not obviously true that the benefits of knowledge are enjoyed collectively. I am unable to do much with the knowledge of stamp collectors or high-energy physicists.

Reply: A reply to *Objection A* might be sought in different directions. One idea is to insist that clean air – the standard case of a collective good – is not as different from knowledge as the critic assumes. We think of clean air as a collective good despite the fact that some people, in some circumstances, can enjoy its benefits individually. Think of people with respiratory illnesses who spend long periods of time in an oxygen tent. Or consider rich people who can afford to fly off to unpolluted islands. Nor should we be overly impressed with the fact that not everyone can enjoy the benefits of knowledge. The same is true for clean air. Even when the collective good has been established, there still might be some people – the poor, for example – who are not able to fully take advantage of the high air quality. Perhaps they are forced to live next to a garbage dump that locally makes for high levels of air pollution.

A different sort of reply might try to fend off *Objection A* by restricting the *scope* of the thesis that knowledge is a collective good. One highly plausible restriction is to suggest that *scientific* knowledge is a collective good. There is plenty of evidence for this view: it is pretty much impossible to think of any new item of scientific knowledge that is not dependent on myriad previous elements, many of which have reached the knower by way of testimony (Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996; Hardwig 1985, 1991; Kusch 2002; Shapin 1994). Or think of the self-referential social knowledge that constitutes the social world (Barnes 1988, Searle 1995). The social world is what it is in good part because of what we believe it to be. And typically these beliefs are true precisely because of the way in which we collectively keep passing them around the community (Kusch 1999).

Objection B: The argument presented in this paper is no contribution to value-driven epistemology – it changes the topic. Value-driven epistemologists are interested in the question what makes individual items of knowledge epistemically valuable. But this paper discusses the question whether *bodies* or *systems* of knowledge have value.

Reply: In doing so I am only following Kvanvig's valuable advice to epistemologists: focus on "bunches of people rather than isolated individuals, bodies of knowledge rather than individuated propositions" (1992: 186). If that constitutes a change of topic, then maybe the topic ought to be changed.

Objection C: I take this objection from Timothy Williamson's influential book *Knowledge and its Limits* (2000: 31). There Williamson defends the views that the concept of knowledge cannot be factored into constituents and that knowledge is the most fundamental factive mental state. Williamson sympathises with Craig's book but finds it "too close to the traditional programme" of analysing knowledge as true belief plus a third and fourth condition. As Williamson sees it, Craig goes wrong when he stipulates that inquirers want "true beliefs about our environment, as though this were somehow more basic than our need for knowledge of the environment".

Reply: A discussion of Williamson's attempt to replace traditional epistemology by a metaphysics of factive mental states lies well beyond the scope of this paper. I therefore have to confine myself to a couple of very general comments. It seems to me important to distinguish between two theses. The first thesis says that *knowledge* can be factorised into components. The second thesis is the claim that the concept of knowledge, analysed along Williamson's proposal, is the product of a conceptual development that at some point involved a factorised concept. It is unclear what reason Williamson has given us for rejecting the second thesis. In other words, one might argue that *knowledge* as the non-analysable concept of a certain kind of factive mental state is itself the endpoint of a conceptual evolution that starts in the conceptual situation described in Craig's state of nature.

My second general comment picks up on recent criticisms of Williams' proposal. Some commentators have suggested that Williams' theory does not in and by itself undo the familiar issues of traditional epistemology (cf. Reed 2005, and Whitcomb 2005). On closer inspection, the familiar problems with accidentality all re-appear. In chapters on which I did not report here, Craig pays a lot of attention to the emergence of such problems with accidentality in the case of protoknowledge. Perhaps this makes his work relevant to Williamson's concerns after all.

Objection D: How can this paper claim to have identified a knowledge-specific epistemic value when it has said nothing about how Gettier cases can be blocked?

Reply: I have tried to show that we can think of knowledge as a collective good without any worked-out proposal of how to deal with Gettier cases. This does not mean that an understanding of Gettier cases is irrelevant. But we do not need to wait for agreement on an anti-Gettier-clause before we can make headway with rendering explicit the social-epistemic value of knowledge. Note also that Reynolds (2002) suggests that the Gettier problem might receive a solution in terms of testimonial norms. If that is right, then this would strengthen the case made here.

Objection E: Given that Craig's *protoknowledge* is not threatened by accidentality, why is it the ancestor of *knowledge* and not of *understanding*?

Reply: As Craig's state of nature stands now, there is no straightforward question to this answer. But I do not see why we should not be able to come up with a genealogical-narrative explanation that would make sense of the social need to operate with both concepts.¹⁵

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Notes

¹ The expression “value-driven epistemology” was coined by Riggs (forthcoming). Pritchard (forthcoming) and Riggs (forthcoming) provide useful reviews of the work to date. Wisdom has received least attention. For a useful discussion, see Whitcomb (2006).

² I have defended a version of (and the term) “communitarian epistemology” in Kusch (2002). I take the formula “highly gregarious and deeply interdependent” from Barnes (2000: ix) who in turn borrows it in the form “highly gregarious and deeply interdependent primates” from Gagnier and Dupré (1998).

³ This way of putting the task comes from Craig (1990: 1).

⁴ E.g. Code 1995, Elgin 1996, Hornsby and Fricker 2000, Goldman 1999, Kusch 2002, Schmitt 1994.

⁵ Craig’s work is discussed and developed in Fricker (1998), Hanfling (2000), Jones (1997), Lane (1999), Neta (forthcoming), Schmitt (1992), and Weinberg (2006). The position explored in Reynolds (2002) is strikingly similar to Craig’s, though Reynolds never mentions Craig (1990). – I have profited most from studying Fricker, Lane and Neta.

⁶ Craig allows that the informant can make the inquirer believe that p without that the informant herself believes that p (Craig 1990: 14-15).

⁷ “What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world!” (Wittgenstein 1961, 82).

⁸ [Consider] “the ... first introduction of the concept of a germ into the language of medicine. This was ... a ... radically new departure, involving not merely a new factual

discovery within an existing way of looking at things, but a completely new way of looking at the whole problem of the causation of diseases, the adoption of new diagnostic techniques, the asking of new kinds of question about illnesses, and so on. In short it involved the adoption of new ways of doing things by people involved, in one way or another, in medical practice. An account of the way in which social relations in the medical profession had been influenced by this new concept would include an account of what that concept was. Conversely, the concept itself is unintelligible apart from its relation to medical practice. ... a new way of talking sufficiently important to rank as a new idea implies a new set of social relationships.” (Winch 1958: 121-3.)

⁹ I am referring of course to the idea of family resemblance concepts, famously introduced by Wittgenstein in §§66-67 of the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953):

66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? ... if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. ...

67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. ...

¹⁰ What then can a genealogical analysis of knowledge tell us about the non-factive uses? Consider only the case of non-factive use found among social scientists. Returning to Craig’s state of nature, and sticking to the demand that conceptual evolution must be in step with developing social relations, it seems natural to suggest that the non-factive use is the result of a further form of objectivisation. Craig’s objectivisation of *protoknowledge* takes us from a concept that is relative to a single individual to a concept that is public; the standards for the good informant have been raised so that by using “protoknowledge” one can recommend an informant to anyone in own community. The obvious next step is to consider a meeting of different communities of different degree of development and with in diverging taxonomies and informational needs. Reflective observers of one tribe, say tribe *A*, might well notice that the other tribe, say *B*, has its own division of cognitive labour, its own testimonial system, and thus its own label for approved sources of information. These reflective members of *A*

might then come to use their own label “protoknower” for someone who – in tribe *B*, by members of *B* – is regarded as a detectable good informant.

¹¹ It is astonishing to note that epistemologists have paid so little attention to this book. The exception that proves the rule is Elgin (2005). I have greatly profited from her discussion.

¹² I had a lot of help with this point. I wish to thank Alexander Bird, Stefan Brenner, Samantha Evans, David Feller, Mike Finn, John Forrester, James Hyslop, Ben Irvine, Nick Jardine, Adam Kay, Jeff Kochan, Sir Geoffrey Lloyd, Paula Olmos, Flavia Padovani, Jason Rampelt, Martin Rudwick, Simon Schaffer, Thomas Soderqvist, and Jorg Tuske.

¹³ Of course there are exceptions. No-one would think that I deserve credit for coming to know what the weather is like, if all I need to do, in order to find out, is to look out the window in front of me (cf. Lackey, forthcoming). Remember that we are not searching for necessary and sufficient conditions.

¹⁴ Shapin (1994) further develops a theme that was already important in Shapin and Schaffer (1985).

¹⁵ I am indebted to Cornelius Menke and Joab Rosenberg for many useful discussions of Craig (1990).