Reasons and Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
Edited with José Luis Bermúdez, Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004hb, 2008pb; available on Oxford Scholarship Online).
Edited with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Edited with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard, Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Co-authored with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard, The Nature and Value of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
‘The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge’, Philosophy, 75, 2000, 73-88.
‘Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality’, in Denis M. Walsh (ed.) Naturalism, Evolution and the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 179-98.
‘The Normativity of Meaning’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.) Logic, Thought and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57-73.
‘Reasons for Action and Instrumental Reasoning’, in José Bermúdez and Alan Millar (eds.) Reason in Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 113-32.
‘Travis’s Sense of Occasion’, Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 2005, 337-42.
'What the Disjunctivist is Right About' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 2007, 176-198.
'The State of Knowing', Philosophical Issues, 17, The Metaphysics of Epistemology, 2007, 179-96.
‘Precis of Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation’ and ‘Replies to Authors’, in Patrizia Pedrini (ed.) Symposium on Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation by Alan Millar, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, (http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums.htm), 6, 2007, 14-23 and 72-90.
‘Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge’ in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
‘Disjunctivism and Skepticism’ in John Greco (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 581-604).
Reprint of ‘The Idea of Experience’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97, 1996, 75-90, in Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (eds.) Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2009).
‘Reasons for Action and Reasons for Belief’ in Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
'What is it that Cognitive Abilities are Abilities to Do?', Acta Analytica, 24, 2009, 223-36.
'Knowledge from Being Told', in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard (eds.) Social Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2010), 175-93.
'Mill on the Cultivation of Feeling', Philosophical Papers, 39, 2010, 457-72.
‘Knowledge and Reasons for Belief’, in Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) Reasons for Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
'Why Knowledge Matters', in The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 85, 2011, 63 - 81.
‘The Epistemological Significance of Practices’, ProtoSociology: An International Journal and Interdisciplinary Project.
http://www.protosociology.de/Download/Millar-Practices.pdf
'How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief', Philosophical Issues, 21,2011, 332-51.
'Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility', forthcoming in Synthese.