Department of Philosophy
Staff
Duncan Pritchard
Epistemic Luck
This page contains a contents list for my book, entitled Epistemic Luck, which is published by Oxford University Press. To visit the relevant OUP webpage, on which you can also read some of the advance praise for the book, click here. You can read the introduction here.
Introduction
Part One: Scepticism
Chapter One: Scepticism in Contemporary Debate
1.0. Introduction
1.1. Infallibilism and Absolute Certainty
1.2. From Infallibilism to the Closure-Based Template Sceptical
Argument
1.3. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter One
Chapter Two: Closure and Context
2.0. Introduction
2.1. Fallibilism and the Denial of Closure
2.2. Epistemological Internalism and Closure
2.3. Knowledge as Sensitivity
2.4. Attributer Contextualist Anti-Sceptical Theories
2.5. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Two
Chapter Three: Neo-Mooreanism
3.0. Introduction
3.1. Neo-Moorean Anti-Scepticism
3.2. Claiming Knowledge
3.3. Wittgenstein Contra Moore on the
Propriety of Claims to Know
3.4. Claiming Knowledge and the Externalism/Internalism
Distinction
3.5. The Structure of Reasons
3.6. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Three
Chapter Four: The Source of Scepticism
4.0. Introduction
4.1. Disillusionment
4.2. Underdetermination and Closure
4.3. Arguing Against Underdetermination
4.4. The Source of Scepticism
4.5. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Four
Part Two: Epistemic Luck
Chapter Five: Luck
5.0. Introduction
5.1. Luck
5.2. Three Benign Varieties of Luck
5.3. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Five
Chapter Six: Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck
6.0. Introduction
6.1. Veritic Epistemic Luck and the Gettier Counterexamples
6.2. Refining the Safety Principle (Part One)-The
Relevant Initial Conditions
6.3. Interlude-Safety versus Sensitivity
6.4. Refining the Safety Principle (Part Two)-Some
Examples and Potential Counterexamples
6.5. Reflective Epistemic Luck
6.6. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Six
Chapter Seven: Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues
7.0. Introduction
7.1. Epistemological Internalism and Cognitive
Responsibility
7.2. Process Reliabilism, Agent Reliabilism and
Virtue Epistemology
7.3. Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Epistemology
7.4. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Seven
Chapter Eight: Scepticism and Epistemic Luck
8.0. Introduction
8.1. Scepticism and Reflective Epistemic Luck
8.2. The Metaepistemological Sceptical Challenge
8.3. The Pyrrhonian Problematic
8.4. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Eight
Chapter Nine: Epistemic Angst
9.0. Introduction
9.1. Wittgenstein on "Hinge" Propositions
9.2. Wittgenstein versus McDowell on
the Structure of Reasons
9.3. A Pragmatic Response to Scepticism
9.4. Epistemic Angst
9.5. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Chapter Nine
Postscript: Moral Luck
10.0. Introduction
10.1. Nagel on Moral Luck
10.2. Williams on Moral Luck and Rational Justification
10.3. Nagel on Epistemic Luck and Scepticism
10.4. Concluding Remarks
Footnotes to Postscript
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