Michael Wheeler
There are certain boundaries that have been thought of as the joints of biological and cognitive nature, by which I mean the interfaces and borders between systems or entities that determine how biological and cognitive nature is, at a fundamental level, organised. In recent years, however, a number of radical theses have been proposed, in philosophy, cognitive science and biology, questioning the philosophical and scientific importance of some of the seemingly most obvious of these boundaries. Such theses form part of the contemporary research agenda in philosophy of biology, philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Here is an example. It might seem obvious that thinking takes place exclusively inside the head. But now consider: We often solve multiplication problems by using 'pen and paper' as an external resource that enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones and to temporarily store the results of intermediate calculations. According to the so-called extended mind hypothesis, the thinking that goes on here is not a wholly internal phenomenon. Rather, it is distributed across the coupled combination of pen-and-paper, bodily manipulations, and in-the-head processing. Here is another example. It might seem obvious (given the way in which genetics occupies the centre stage in contemporary biology), that if one wants to understand biological inheritance, then one will focus on genes. But, according to some thinkers (e.g. niche construction theorists), the mechanisms that explain inheritance should often be extended to include nongenetic organismic and environmental factors. My next book, Extended X: Recarving the Biological and Cognitive Joints of Nature, critically examines the arguments for these and other extension claims. One task will be to gauge the persuasiveness of the various extension arguments in their own domains. Another will be to identify and analyse common patterns and/or significant differences in how the various cases for extension are made, in order to understand whether or not such arguments are the local manifestations of a general shift in our understanding of how biological and cognitive nature is organised.
Some draft chapters are available by following the links below. These chapters concentrate on the extended mind hypothesis. Please do not quote from or cite these chapters without prior permission from me: email me. Comments welcome. Other chapters have not been made available here because they contain significant amounts of material that has already been published or is 'in press' with journals and collections.
Chapter 2: The Extended Cognition Hypothesis
Chapter 3: Sameness and Difference
Chapter 5: Making Your Mind Up
Bibliography for Chapters 2 to 5
The research presented here has been made possible by research leave granted by the University of Stirling and by AHRC Research Leave award, AH/F002963/1.
